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  Since	   the	   problem	   of	   free	   will	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   discussed	   issues	   in	   analytic	  philosophy	  since	  the	  ‘70s,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  perspective	  from	  which	  one	  is	  able	  to	  look	  at	  the	  problem	  in	  a	  novel	  way.	  Yet	  Robert	  Lockie’s	  book	  “Free	  Will	  and	  Epistemology”	  does	  just	  this	  through	  approaching	  the	  problem	  from	  an	  epistemological	  point	  of	  view.	  He	  argues,	   rather	  exhaustively,	   that	   the	  belief	   in	  Libertarian	   free	   will	   is	   justified	   because	   an	   agent	   is	   able	   to	   justify	   any	   of	   her	  beliefs	  only	  if	  she	  has	  free	  will	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  determinism.	  	  	   The	  book	  consists	  of	  ten	  chapters	  (plus	  an	  introduction),	  and	  it	  is	  divided	  into	   two	  main	  parts.	  The	   first	   five	  chapters	  are	  centered	  around	  arguing	   that	  a	  deontic	  concept	  of	  internalism	  cannot	  be	  eliminated	  from	  epistemology.	  	  	  The	   first	   chapter	   defines	   and	   clarifies	   this	   concept.	   Deontic	   internalists	  hold	  three	  strongly	  related	  claims.	  First,	  they	  hold	  that	  one’s	  belief	  is	  rational	  and	  in	   this	   sense	   justified	   if	   and	   only	   if	   she	   is	   not	   blameworthy	   for	   violating	   her	  related	  epistemic	  obligations.	  Second,	   they	  claim	  that	  agent	  can	  have	  epistemic	  obligations	   only	   if	   she	   has	   responsibility-­‐relevant	   access	   and	   control	   over	   her	  cognition.	   Third,	   they	   endorse	   the	   view	   according	   to	  which	  whether	   the	   agent	  has	   responsibility-­‐relevant	   access	   and	   control	   over	   her	   cognition	   in	   a	   given	  circumstance	  depends	  on	  the	  internal	  features	  of	  the	  agent’s	  cognition.	  Thus,	  the	  deontic	   account	   of	   justification	   explains	   why	   the	   deontic	   internalist	   is	   an	  internalist	  with	  respect	  to	  justification.	  	  The	   second	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   ‘regulative’	  and	   the	   ‘theoretical’	   in	   epistemology.	   Lockie	   argues,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   that	  internalist	  theories	  of	  justification	  can	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  rationality,	  and	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   externalist	   theories	   of	   justification	   can	   result	   in	   the	   adequate	  theory	   of	   knowledge.	   That	   is,	   (deontic)	   internalism	   cannot	   give	   an	   account	   of	  knowledge	  but	  it	  has	  an	  indispensable	  role	  in	  guiding	  us	  regarding	  what	  we	  have	  to	  do	  in	  order	  to	  be	  rational.	  From	  Chapter	  3	  to	  Chapter	  5,	  Lockie	  attempts	  to	  refute	  various	  arguments	  against	   deontic	   internalism.	   In	   Chapter	   3,	   Lockie	   focuses	   on	   those	   arguments	  which	   are	   based	   on	   the	   reflection	   of	   doxastic	   voluntarism.	   He	   does	   this	   by	  pointing	   out	   that	   even	   if	   agents	   are	   not	   able	   to	   choose	   their	   belief,	   deontic	  internalism	  remains	  intact	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  free	  to	  self-­‐regulate	  their	  cognition	  by	   controlling	   their	   attention	   and	   other	   executive	   functions.	   	   Chapter	   4,	  which	  brilliantly	   plugs	   an	   irritating	   gap	   in	   the	   literature,	   argues	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  results	  of	  the	  cognitive	  sciences	  that	  agents	  do	  have	  sufficient	  control	  over	  these	  functions.	   In	   Chapter	   5,	   Lockie	   turns	   the	   table	   and	   argues	   what	   cannot	   be	  coherently	   defended	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   purely	   externalist	   account	   of	   epistemology	  because	  denying	   that	  we	  have	  epistemically	   relevant	   freedom	  of	   cognition	  and	  deontic	  epistemic	  duties	   is	  self-­‐refuting.	   If	  one	  claims	  that	  nobody	  has	  relevant	  control	   over	   her	   way	   of	   thinking,	   she	   has	   to	   admit	   that	   she	   herself	   does	   not	  
control	   her	   cognition	   in	   the	   light	   of	   her	   reasons.	  Moreover,	   insofar	   as	   she	   also	  
calls	  us	  to	  reject	  that	  we	  have	  deontic	  epistemic	  duties	  because	  she	  believes	  that	  to	  be	  justified	  depends	  only	  on	  external	  relations	  between	  beliefs	  and	  the	  world,	  she	  cannot	  justify	  even	  this	  imperative	  because	  she	  relies	  on	  a	  ‘final	  ought’	  which	  cannot	  be	  justified	  by	  a	  purely	  externalist	  account.	  	  These	   arguments	   are	   transcendental	   ones	   of	  which	   the	   goal	   is	   to	   show	  that	   particular	   totalizing	   and	   reductivist	   claims	   are	   self-­‐refuting.	   Many	   worry	  that	  these	  kinds	  of	  transcendental	  arguments	  are	  invalid	  in	  general	  but	  who	  does	  not	  have	   this	   general	   suspicion	  may	   find	   the	   argument	   for	  deontic	   internalism	  plausible.	   Furthermore,	   in	   Chapter	   8	   and	   10,	   Lockie	   provides	   other	   epistemic	  transcendental	  arguments	  based	  on	  his	  epistemic	  results.	  These	  arguments	  are	  against	  the	  belief	  in	  universal	  determinism	  and	  the	  denial	  of	  libertarian	  free	  will	  that	  are	  the	  main	  targets	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  book.	  	  Before	  Lockie	  turns	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  universal	  determinism,	  he	  defends	  the	   principle	   ‘ought	   implies	   can’	   (OIC)	   against	   Frankfurt-­‐style	   examples	   in	  Chapter	  6.	  Lockie’s	  main	  point	  against	  Frankfurt-­‐style	  examples	  is	  that	  the	  most	  intuitive	  ones	   let	   the	   agent	  attempt	   to	  produce	  more	  than	  one	  event,	   thus	   they	  are	  not	  good	  counter-­‐examples	  to	  OIC	  given	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  do	  two	  different	  actions.	  The	   argumentation	  of	   Lockie	   is	   plausible	   to	  me	  but	   there	  was	  missing	  the	  analysis	  of	   those	  examples	   in	  which	  the	   indeterminism	  can	  be	   found	  not	  at	  the	  moment	   of	   intention	   formation	   but	   before	   this	  moment	   somewhere	   in	   the	  deliberation	  process.	  	  Chapter	  7	   is	   one	  of	   the	  most	  novel	   chapters	  of	   the	  book.	   It	   reinterprets	  and	  uses	  the	  (in)famous	  Logon	  AErgon,	  aka	  the	  Lazy	  Argument,	  which	  says	  that	  “if	   determinism	   is	   true,	   all	   our	   strivings	   are	   equally	   futile	   to	   an	   absolute	   and	  categorical	   degree”	   (153).	   Lockie	   attempts	   to	   rebut	   the	   most	   well-­‐known	  answers	   to	   this	   argument	   but	   I	   am	   not	   convinced	   that	   he	   successfully	   argues	  against	  the	  co-­‐fated	  response.	  The	  determinists	  differentiate	  between	  acts	  which	  are	   superficial	   or	   cannot	   produce	   their	   intended	   consequences	   and	  which	   are	  indispensible	   for	   producing	   a	   consequence.	   In	   response	   to	   this,	   Lockie	   argues	  that	  if	  the	  act	  is	  determined	  by	  someone	  other	  than	  the	  agent,	  the	  agent	  cannot	  determine	  the	  act	  qua	  his	  agential	  powers.	  Granted	  that	  this	  is	  Lockie’s	  ultimate	  answer	  to	  the	  determinist,	   the	  main	  question	  becomes	  whether	  determinism	  is	  compatible	  with	  agency?	  Since	  the	  Lazy	  Argument	  argues	  that	  our	  strivings	  are	  
futile	  and	  not	  that	  there	  are	  no	  strivings	  (which	  are	  basic	  actions)	  at	  all,	  the	  Lazy	  argument	   is	  not	   the	   real	   challenge	   for	   the	  determinist.	  Although	  Lockie	   argues	  that	  agency	  is	  incompatible	  with	  determinism,	  he	  does	  not	  have	  enough	  room	  to	  do	   this	   because	   he	   reinterprets	   and	   defends	   the	   Lazy	   Argument	   in	   the	   same	  chapter.	  Chapter	  8	  in	  which	  Lockie	  gives	  three	  different	  transcendental	  arguments	  against	  determinism	   is,	   in	  my	  view,	   the	  most	  remarkable	  part	  of	   the	  book.	  The	  conative	  argument	  shows	  that	   if	  everything	   is	   futile	   in	  a	  deterministic	  universe	  as	   the	   Lazy	   Argument	   concludes,	   it	   is	   pointless	   to	   try	   to	   understand	   the	  arguments	   for	   and	   against	   determinism	   and	   so	   futile	   to	   justify	   belief	   in	  determinism.	  The	  ethical	   transcendental	   argument’s	   aim	   is	   that	   embracing	  OIC	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  reasonably	  accept	  determinism.	  If	  one	  holds	  both	  of	  them,	  she	  should	  claim	  that	   there	   is	  no	  deontic	  basis	   to	  morality	  at	  all,	   so	  she	  has	  no	  basis	   for	   opposing	   those	   who	   reject	   this	   position	   towards	   deontic	   morality.	  Finally,	  the	  indirect	  epistemic	  transcendental	  argument	  argues	  that	  since	  a	  belief	  
can	  be	  unjustified	  only	  if	  one	  ought	  to	  believe	  something	  else,	  if	  someone	  accepts	  determinism,	  she	  should	  accept	  also	  that	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  falsity	  of	  determinism	  cannot	  be	  unjustified.	  	  In	   sum,	   if	   these	   arguments	   are	   on	   the	   right	   track,	   there	   is	   a	   normative	  asymmetry	   between	   determinists	   and	   those	   who	   believe	   in	   an	   undetermined	  Libertarian	  free	  will.	  The	  determinist	  is	  even	  in	  principle	  not	  able	  to	  show	  herself	  as	   someone	  who	   justified	   her	   belief	   in	   determinism	  but	   the	   Libertarian	   can	   in	  principle	   justify	  her	  belief	   in	  epistemic	  (deontic)	   justification	  and	  free	  will.	   It	   is	  clear	  that	  Lockie’s	  book	  is	  not	  the	  last	  word	  on	  these	  matters	  but	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  nice	  to	  see	  a	  lively	  debate	  about	  these	  arguments.	  	  Chapter	  9	  argues	  that	  self-­‐determined	  agency	  is	  a	  third	  possibility	  besides	  undetermined	   and	   (pre)determined	   agency.	   However,	   an	   agent-­‐causal	  metaphysics	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  cash	  out	  its	  nature,	  only	  an	  emergentist	  substance-­‐free	  metaphysics	  will	   do	   the	   job.	   Furthermore,	   Lockie	   claims	   that	   reasons	   and	  the	   self	   do	   not	   overdetermine	   actions	   because	   “reasons	   only	   are	   reasons	   in	   a	  mind	  and	   for	  a	  self”	  (207).	  They	  only	  have	  any	  role	   	   through	  the	  activity	  of	   the	  self.	   In	   the	   last	   chapter,	   Lockie	   argues	   that	   compatiblists	   are	   unable	   to	  plausibly	  explain	  self-­‐determination	  because	  if	  determinism	  is	  true,	  the	  self	  has	  to	  be	  ultimately	  determined	  not	  by	  itself	  but	  the	  Big	  Bang	  and	  the	  natural	  laws.	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  chapter,	  Lockie	  gives	  another	  transcendental	  argument.	  Briefly,	   it	   says	   that	   insofar	  as	  one	  believes	   in	  determinism,	  she	  should	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  every	  belief	  (even	  her	  belief	   in	  determinism)	  is	  determined	  not	   by	   epistemic	   justifiers	   but	   by	   the	   Big	   Bang	   and	   the	   natural	   laws.	   So,	   she	  should	   see	   her	   belief	   in	   determinism	   as	   an	   epistemically	   unjustified	   view.	  Nevertheless,	  Lockie	  does	  not	  wholeheartedly	  support	  this	  argument	  because	  it	  proves	   too	  much.	   It	   seems	   that	   if	   the	  argument	   is	   right,	   there	  could	  be	  no,	   say,	  biological	   determination	   in	   a	   deterministic	   universe	   which	   seems	   to	   be	  implausible.	  	   Lockie	  deserves	  praise	  for	  connecting	  the	  topics	  of	  epistemology	  and	  free	  will	   in	  a	  clear	  and	  thoughtful	  way.	  Although,	   I	   think	   	   the	  Lazy	  Argument	   is	  still	  not	  particularly	  powerful,	  Lockie’s	  ethical	  and	  indirect	  epistemic	  transcendental	  arguments	   pose	   a	  more	   serious	   challenge	   for	   the	   opponent	   of	   Libertarianism.	  Even	   more	   importantly,	   Lockie’s	   book	   persuasively	   shows	   the	   intimate	  connection	   between	   deontic	   internalism	   and	   Libertarianism.	   If	   they	   are	   so	  closely	  related	  to	  each	  other,	  Lockie	  provides	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  reasons	  in	  the	  literature	  for	  embracing	  Libertarian	  free	  will.	  	  	  Reviewed	  by	  László	  Bernáth,	  Institute	  of	  Philosophy	  at	  Hungarian	  Academy	  of	  Sciences.	  	  	  
